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Political protesters often don’t play by the rules. Think of the Occupy
Movement, which brought lower Manhattan to a standstill in 2011 under
the slogan, “We are the 99%”. Closer to home, think of the refugee activists
who assisted a breakout from South Australia’s Woomera detention centre
in 2002. Both are examples of contentious politics, or forms of political
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engagement outside the institutional channels of political decision-making.
The democratic credentials of contentious politics are highly ambivalent.
On the one hand, contentious politics appears to have insufficient respect
for democratic decision. Protesters are often forceful, uncivil and rowdy,
aiming to disproportionately influence policy. But shouldn’t proposals be
put forward with civility through the proper channels? And shouldn’t their
proponents accept with good grace if they are democratically rebuffed?
In my current home, Singapore, contention is viewed as dangerous, at any
moment threatening to destabilise the hard-won authority of the
government. Consequently it is not tolerated.
At the same time, history offers countless
examples of social change that is now
consolidated and popularly supported, but
which was only achieved through protests that
were judged at the time to be extreme and
immoderate. Notably, the Australian Freedom
Ride of 1965, which challenged the
subordinate status of Indigenous Australians,
was highly controversial. Today its 50th
anniversary is celebrated and recognised in
the mainstream media and the halls of power.
A closer look at the history of political thought can provide us with the
framework to assess the case for and against the democratic
reasonableness of contentious politics.
Hobbes’ citizens accept authority
Best known for his claim that the natural human condition is one of war
and all against all, 17th-century English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes is often misrepresented as the ultimate theorist of contentious
politics. He actually views conflict as antithetical to good democratic
politics (or indeed to any politics at all).
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For Hobbes, the purpose of politics is to
escape war. As such, he insists that in order to
establish a democratic political order, all
individuals need to hand over their will to a
single point of ultimate authority – in this
case, the democratic assembly. Hobbes
thought that citizens should accept the
determination of the democratic assembly,
even when it ruled against their own preferred
outcomes.
In Hobbes’ ideal democracy, democratic
citizens do have some recourse when they
disagree with the assembly. He distinguishes
between counsel and exhortation. He sees it as
permissible to offer counsel to the ruling
assembly. But it is unacceptable for the citizen to become vehement or to
let their own interests drive their demand, as this amounts to exhortation.
If citizens were free to protest and seek to overturn the democratic decision
whenever they chose, the system would not be one of pure rule by the
people, but rather a rule by the people distorted to appease the protesters.
Machiavelli sees room for conflict
The Hobbesian view, while influential, is not the only way to think about
political contestation and democratic rule. Written more than a century
before Hobbes’s Leviathan, the ideas expressed in Niccolò Machiavelli’s
The Prince are still very popular, making him the archetypal cynical and
ruthless adviser to rulers who want nothing more than to hold firmly onto
power.
However, Machiavelli’s other major work, The Discourses on Livy, has
some important lessons for the future of democracy. By looking at the
recent histories of Florence and Venice, along with the ancient history of
Rome, he makes clear that while some conflicts of authority are
destructive, others are constructive.
Although not concerned about democracy in the modern sense,
Machiavelli firmly defends the political power and worth of the common
people. He argues that some constructive conflict is necessary for them to
enjoy status and liberty in the political order.
Renaissance Florence had been racked by conflict. Different sects hated
each other, and the polity was tossed violently from one ruling power to
another. Weakened by the transitions, it was easy prey for external
domination. Through this conflict, the lot of the Florentine people was very
wretched.
Ancient Rome was also marked by conflict. The plebs (the common people)
periodically disrupted ordinary politics. They closed their shops, refused
military service, ran noisily down the streets or even left the city en masse
when they desired something. Unsurprisingly, the Romans were not afraid
to bring accusations against arrogant rulers.
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Curiously, during all the centuries of conflict in the Roman republic, it was
never deeply disordered. Very few citizens were exiled or killed. Instead,
there were countless examples of great virtue among citizens, and the laws
supported the common good and public freedom.
Constructive vs destructive conflict
Machiavelli identifies a crucial difference between the two cases. In Rome,
the citizens were by and large committed to living together in a society on
fair terms. Their ultimate goal was not the eradication of the opposed
party; their conflicts were aimed at improving the laws, not using the laws
to eliminate their opponent.
In Florence, the parties were corrupt in the sense of not seeking a fair
common good. Instead, they sought to overcome and crush their
opponents.
This type of self-serving conflict destroys liberty. It seizes everything from
the losers and denies their existence in the polity. It also produces
instability because there is so much at stake in who is ruling. Ultimately, it
weakens the polity because there is no public good to be committed to and
inspired by.
Hence, the protagonist of constructive conflict is committed to the good of
the political order and acknowledges the reasonable interests of
opponents. Destructive conflict involves self-interested competition
without any higher commitment to living together on reasonable terms.
How does this distinction between kinds of conflict apply to present-day
politics?
The 1965 Australian Freedom Ride campaign exemplifies the effectiveness
of constructive conflict. The zero-sum racialised conflict suffered by the
Solomon Islands over recent decades illustrate the impacts of destructive
conflict.
On Machiavelli’s view, the vast majority of political contestation that we
see within democracies today would count as constructive conflict.
Undeniably, constructive conflict is preferable to destructive conflict, but
this raises the question: why do we need conflict at all? Would Rome have
been an even greater polity if it had managed to avoid all conflict?
A standard trope of civic republican writing in Machiavelli’s time was to
lament the tumultuous character of the Roman republic, often in
unflattering contrast to the serene harmony of the republican city-state of
Venice.
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Machiavelli rejects this evaluation. The cost of Venice’s harmony was a
political order heavily weighted towards the interests of the nobles and
away from the common people.
Contemporary nobles and commoners
In any polity, past or present, there are always powerful nobles (or, as we
know them today, corporations and the corporate tycoons heading them,
the Murdochs, the Berlusconis, the Koch brothers), who do not of their
own accord treat the masses well.
In Machiavelli’s view, the people only secure their own freedom when they
actively contest the power and influence of the nobles. The Roman plebs
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only flourished because of their shrill demands for inclusion and respect
against the conservative reluctance of the nobles.
This is because the rich and powerful can bend
politics through the normal channels for their
own ends. Both sides of parliamentary politics
struggle not to be swayed by these powerful
entities: whether by their donations (see the
Koch brothers’ influence on the Republican
presidential nomination campaign in the US)
or by their capacity to make and unmake
governments, as with the mining industry’s
attack on Kevin Rudd.
While there may be a legitimate need for
citizens to defer to democratic decisions most
of the time, unconditional deference might
allow oligarchical tendencies to consolidate themselves.
Forgoing the Hobbesian view, where the persistence of protest and
contentious politics attests to a deficient and weak political order,
Machiavelli’s analysis encourages us to value contestatory politics as an
important bulwark against the undemocratic meddling of the rich and
powerful.
Our worry today should not be that there is too much contentious politics,
but that there is too little. The stealthy capture of democracy by corporate
interests needs constantly to be called out.
Rather than hope for a deferential population that does not contest
government decisions, we should recognise the role of even the most
unruly protest in defending inclusiveness and fairness in society, so long as
it is grounded in a constructive sense of shared democratic future.
